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Abstract
This paper is an attempt to establish an objective criterion for civilizations, in order to treat them
impartially and give them a fair assessment. First, theories up to the present about civilizations including
those of Spengler and Toynbee are introduced. Second, the criterion presented by Bagby to distinguish
major civilizations and peripheral civilizations are examined and proved to be subjective. Then the
author proposes as an objective criterion for big civilizations just the pattern of succeeding four stages
with the span of 400-500 years each. Big civilizations meeting this requirement which total eight or
nine are divided into two types according to the difference of their nature. Lastly is shown how four
puzzles of world history that have hitherto caused a lot of disputes (feudalism, absolute power of royalty,
capitalism and modernization) can be solved through the recognition of these big civilizations.
1
A certain group of civilizations has since the middle of the nineteenth century drawn the attention
of scholars of comparative civilization. Different names were given to that group: Culturkreis (Heinrich
Ruckert1 ), kulturhistorischer Typus or Zivilisation (Nicolai Danilewsky2), Hochkultur (Oswald Spengler3 ),
major civilization (Philip Bagby4) and independent civilization (Arnold Toynbee5). Their substance how-
ever seems to be almost the same, for the names of the civilizations listed are alike. Let this group be called
here provisionally the big civilizations.
Vollgraff as well as Lasaulx roughly described the big civilization as an organic body (organism) which
runs the definite course of birth, growth, breakdown and death. They dealt almost exclusively with two
examples of Greece-Rome and Western Europe6 . Heinrich Ruckert added further to them the Orient,China,
Mexico and Peru7 . Since Nicolai Danilewsky the definition became more and more precise and the number of
civilizations being described increased. Danilewsky describes three stages of development: the preparatory
stage lasting several thousands of years, the middle stage of about one thousand years settling a state to
begin actions, and the final stage lasting for several hundred years, when creative activities vividly take
place in all fields of culture. His examples are Egypt, China, Babylonia, India, Iran, Judea, Greece, Rome,
the New Semites and Europe8 .
According to Kurt Breysig there are five sorts of ages indicating the progress of human societies: primitive
societies, ancient states, the mediaeval age, the modern age and the latest modern age. The ancient state
has the king with absolute power, whereas the mediaeval age has a number of nobles provided with real
political power. The mediaeval age is also characterized a.s the era of religious faith. In the modern age cities
arise, commerce and industries prosper, arts and sciences come to flourish, followed by the latest modern
age when we see the urban economy being most prosperous, faith declining, and masses of people getting
more and more power. Many races on earth achieve as far as the ancient state; only Greece-Rome, Western
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Europe, Japan and India went through the mediaeval age, of which merely Greece-Rome and Western
Europe advanced to the modern age and further to the latest modern age9 .
We know of Oswald Spengler exhibiting, in his Decline of the West, charts of three kinds of historical
course (intellectual, cultural and political), in which we find particulars of the pattern of transition marking
the big civilizations. It begins with the preparatory stage of an agricultural society, goes through the
cultural epoch of feudal aristocracy and then through that of urban citizens, until it arrives in the long
run at the stage of the inorganic megalopolis. His big civilizations are Egypt, Mesopotamia, China, India,
Greece-Rome, Western Europe, Arabia and MexicolO .
Arnold Toynbee finds in his Study of History the pattern of 'full blown civilizations' merely in the age
of political disunity (years not indicated), the age of wars (400 years), and the age of the universal state
(400 yearsll ), but in Reconsiderations we find him trying to classify these civilizations into two groups
(independent civilizations and satellite civilizations) on the base of whether a civilization is independent of
or dependent on another contemporary civilization. His independent (in our word, big) civilizations are 13 in
all: Middle America, Andes, Sumer-Accad, Egypt, Aegean, Indus, China, Syria, Hellenic, India, Orthodox
Christian, Western Europe and Islam12 .
Toynbee was stimulated to this classification by Philip Bagby. It was Bagby who gave us for the first time
clear outlines of the major (in our word, big) civilizations, through comparing them with other civilizations
which he called peripheral or secondary. Because this distinction of his found assent among scholars and
often brought up as the criterion of civilizations, we should like to introduce it to some detail and examine
its validity in the following.
2
Bagby's view is summed up as follows:
(a) The big civilization develops for itself both on the political level (from disintegration to an integrated
universal state) and on the cultural level (from the age of faith to the age of reason). This factor is not to
be found in a secondary civilization, or if it is, it merely reflects the development of a big civilization.
(b) The whole process in the development of a big civilization, from the beginning to the formation of
the universal state, takes between 1000 and 1500 years (or to narrow it, between 1100 and 1300 years).
Secondary civilizations are much shorter in duration.
(c) Secondary civilizations borrow from other civilizations. They lack originality or at least those features
of their culture which are original are rarely borrowed by other civilizations. None of the great art-styles and
systems of thought which have had so much influence throughout the world can be ascribed to a secondary
civilization.
Based on this standard he lists nine big civilizations: Egypt, Babylonia (= Mesopotamia) , China, India,
Greece-Rome, Peru, Middle America, Western Europe and Near East. Secondary civilizations are about
thirty: Hittite, Aegean, Celt, Russia, Ceylon, Burma, Tibet, Japan, Korea and so on13 .
Now to examine these three criteria, (a) and (b) which are themselves of an objective nature do not come
into question. (c) however is a problem, because 'borrowing', 'originality' and 'influence' are of subjective
character.
Borrowing, to begin with, can be pointed out in so many civilizations that it must be accounted as the
normal state of civilization in general. European civilization for example is full of borrowed elements from
Greece-Rome, Arabia, Judea etc. Second, judgement or comparative valuation of originality depends largely
on who judges or valuates it. The art-style of his own civilization can be easily taken for 'great'. As to
systems of thought, they should be regarded as phenomena of the civilizational style that inclines towards
rational thinking.
Third, the power of influence can fluctuate according to the spacial distance between civilizations,
the difference of their constitutions, the difficulty of diffusion of cultural elements and the difference of
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civilizational generations or of stages of development. A.L.Kroeber says that an isolated culture such as
Japan is unlikely to produce much that will be passed on to others, and he regarded Egypt as a similar
casel4 . That China exerted a great influence on surrounding areas can be understood, when we consider
that China belongs to the civilization antecedent to Japan and that it was surrounded on all sides by
primitive societies.
The arguments above suggest the conclusion that the propriety of taking (c) as a criterion is doubtful.
Bagby however makes much account of and use of it. About Near Eastern civilization for instance he
admits that it does not satisfy (a) and (b) , but he considers the elements of a religion with a single God,
the endogamous and residentially-separate religious community, sacred rulers, art-forms emphasizing the
immanence of the divine in man and nature, the dome in architecture, the steam-bath, styles of dressing
and preparing food enough to meet the requirements of (c) and came to the conclusion that it is a big
civilizationl5 . Under such a supposition, I dare say, there seems to exist many other big civilizations.
He says next on Japan: "Japan is clearly peripheral since it has borrowed from China its style of writing,
many of its art-styles and the Chinese form of the Buddhist religion. In the last century there has also been
extensive borrowing from Western Europe. Nevertheless, in some respects Japanese civilization appears to
resemble the major rather than the secondary civilizations. Its social institutions, for instance, seem to have
undergone independently a development involving first feudalism and then the rise of a merchant class, a
development which is also found in some of the major civilizations, but in China only at a much earlier
time. It is possible therefore that we should class Japanese civilization as a major civilization in spite of its
borrowings from China. This question cannot, however, be settled until we know a good deal more about
the processes of development of the major civilizations." 16
Japan satisfies (a) and (b), but is in short of (c), thus it is just the inverse case to the Near East. Bagby's
conclusion is that it is a secondary civilization. However, when a civilization is secondary because of much
borrowing, Western Europe must be first of all secondary, for it has borrowed writing and religion from
Syria, vocabulary, philosophy, laws and art-styles from Greece-Rome, science, technology, literature from
Arabia and so forth, namely various elements in various periods.
After saying so on Japan, he mentions Russia: "Similar considerations may also apply to Russian
civilization which appears to have been peripheral first to Near Eastern and then to Western-European, but
also in the last century or two to exhibit some of the earmarks of a major civilization in its early stages." 17
We can hardly understand this proposal, either. When he wants to claim as a big civilization, a civiliza-
tion that does not fulfill any criteria of (a), (b) and (c) at all, but merely exhibits earmarks of early stages,
we must say virtually no criterion has been found. When a criterion, even if false, is applied impartially,
we are convinced of it, but Bagby's method of application is also careless, and arbitrary as well.
To give a supplementary explanation, Bagby's criterion (c) seems to expose unintentionally what other
researchers of civilizations have so far tacitly used for judging civilizations. Danilewsky, Spengler and
Toynbee all explicitly used objective standards corresponding to (a) and (b). On the other hand they no
doubt attached most importance to a concealed standard corresponding to (c), without mentioning it at
any time and without seeing the need for mentioning it.
Toynbee's Reconsiderations criticizes Bagby's attempt as follows: "A comparative student's attitude and
feeling towards the civilization into which he has been born, and also towards one in whose classical literature
he has been educated, can never be the same as his attitude and feeling towards other civilizations with
which his relation is less intimate. Any attempt to classify civilizations according to their relative value will
open the door wide for the intrusion of subjective judgements. We cannot venture into this field profitably,
or even safely, unless we can find some objective criterion. This is not provided by Bagby's proposed
distinction between civilizations that are 'secondary and peripheral' and those that are 'major'. ,,18
This criticism exposes a central weakness in Bagby's method. But Toynbee, in saying so, repeats the
error. After the statement above he says: "But it should be possible to distinguish objectely between
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civilizations that are 'satellites' of others and civilizations that are independent of any other contemporary
civilizations, though they may be affiliated to one or more antecedent civilizations." Instead of the list
of civilizations in A Stu.dy of History, he thus proposed a new classification of civilizations, dividing them
into independent and satellite. Examples of independent civilizations are shown above, those of satellite
civilizations are Mississipi, South West, North Andes, South Andes, Elamite, Hittite, Urart, Iran, Korea,
Japan, Vietnam, South East Asia, Tibet, Russia, etc19 .
His criterion of division lies solely in whether a civilization is independent from any other contemporary
civilization, is ambiguous. When the dependence of China on India, of India on Hellenic (Greece-Rome)
and of Orthodox Christian on Western Europe do not preclude their 'independence', then he has to describe
in what points the dependences of J aDan and of Korea on China preclude them from 'independence'. Is it
not possible that his subjectivity entered into this adjudication? We may wonder also why he took up only
the dependence on a contemporary civilization, but not that on a preceding civilization. Did he not take
account of, or did he not care for the relation between the civilization to which he himself belongs and the
civilization antecedent to it (Hellenic)? In addition, we may suppose that according to his way of counting
primitive societies, Mississippi, South West (of North America) and others, as civilizations, the isolated
society of the Eskimos living in the periphery of the North Pole should be an independent civilization.
Since he did not make this classification, we may presume he used another implicit criterion.
We may assume that Toynbee embarked on his opposition to Bagby more or less light-heartedly to
establish a two-part classification. We should rather read this Toynbee as a warning example of how
difficult it is to exclude subjective judgements. The question is after all the subjective judgements that
are inevitable when once we begin to make any comparative valuation of civilizations. Until we find an
objective criterion which excludes subjectivity and applies indiscriminately and uniformly to all, we will
never be able to settle the classification of civilizations.
3
Is it possible, then, to create a purely objective criterion?
The purely objective criterion lies in the time span and in the pattern of historical changes evident to
everyone's eyes. It comes to be acknowledged by itself, when we check the history of each civilization and,
taking account of its details, get a bird's eye view of it.
Might not a subjective arbitrariness always enter into the search for rules in history? Some say that
elements are freely chosen from innumerable possibilities of historical facts in order to make rules. Karl
Popper for instance says: 'Once we believe in a law of repetitive life-cycles, we are sure to discover historical
confirmation of it nearly everywhere. But this is merely one of many instances of metaphysical theories
seemingly confirmed by facts - facts which, if examined more closely, turn out to be selected in the light
of the very theories they are supposed to test.'20
But I dare say such criticism is made by those who have never attempted this work. Most histories of
countries or of regions are compiled without any concern for historical rules, but when we compare them,
we become aware at once of their similar aspects. By similar aspects I mean coincidences in the change of
political systems. coincidences in the change of social situations, coincidences in the duration of periods; in
short, the existence of a common pattern coming so clearly before our eyes before our subjectivity gets to
work. It is what we just call rule or law.
I made a comparative survey on histories of civilized societies and confirmed that eight or nine societies
have the pattern of four stages in common, with each stage lasting 400-500 years. There seem to be the
following two types.
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Type A: allied tribal powers -+ a unified state -+ wars -+ world empire.
This type includes Egypt, China (until the Han Dynasty), Japan, Peru, Western Europe and probably
Tibet.
Type B: coexistence of tribal powers -+ coexistence of city states -+ wars -+ world empire.
This type includes Sumer, India (until the Gupta Dynasty) and Greece-Rome.
Type A and Type B differ only in the first and second stages; that is, Type A has one emperor dominating
the civilization, while Type B none. This emperor appears with the birth of Type A civilization, takes the
helm of state in the first and second stages and falls down in general to a mere spiritual authority during
the third stage.
We can observe further that the sequence of the four stages is accompanied with such phenomena as the
development of technology, the rise of cities, the development of commerce and industry, the overpowering
the upper by the lower class, the upward trend of the masses, the increase of intelligence, etc.
This group of civilizations corresponds to what has been hitherto mainly studied under various names,
here termed big civilization. Their four stages are shown in the table21 .
Histories of other societies, for instance Cambodia, Indonesia, Ceylon and so forth, let us know, how
they differ from the category of the big civilization. To be brief, they have neither four stages, each with the
term 400",,500 years, nor the historical dynamism of gradual development of technology, growth of cities,
rise of the people, increase of intelligence, etc. Noticeable above all is the fact that in case of the group of big
civilizations various classes including nobles appear between the emperor and the people, moving upward
and increasingly quarreling each other. In these other cases the distance between the two is maintained and
is never closed.
'This historical dynamism is a pretty objective factor, but should we make it the criterion for identifying
a big civilization? And should we further add to this factor such subjective factors as borrowing, originality
and influence? The four stages with each 400",,500 years, i.e. (1) allied tribal powers or coexistence of tribal
powers, (2) one unified state or coexistence of city states, (3) wars, (4) world empire: this restriction is
strict and sufficient enough to distinguish big civilizations as a group from others. So I suppose that this
regulation or criterion or definition will be sufficient on its own.
Can the size of the geographical area be a requisite of the big civilization? Egypt was a civilization on
a plain 1700 km long and but 3""30 km wide; the surroundings are deserts. The area of Greece in the age
of poleis is estimated to have been no more than that of Kyushu, an island of Japan. Chinese civilization
developed until the third stage mainly along the Yellow River, an area which does not seem to be larger
than that of Japan. The big civilization, as it enters into the fourth stage, begins to expand, and so does
Japan to overseas territories as far as China, Cambodia, Siam and Java. Toynbee who treated Japan of
the Tokugawa period as a 'universal state' in his Study of History, assumes later in Reconsiderations a
conciliatory attitude to the criticism on the plea of the area. The criticism was that 'to characterise the
Tokugawa Shogunate as the "universal state" is to push an abstraction to the point of fantasy.' Toynbee
refuted it saying that 'the equation of the Japanese Isles with the World might indeed appear to be a
geographical absurdity. Yet every soi-disant universal state that has come and gone so far has fallen very
far short of being literally world-wide. The universality of a universal state has, so far, been something
subjective.' But he took account of the situation of the Tokugawa period, that Japan continued to live on
cultural capital previously imported from China or via China - this situation however does not seem to us
to have any concern with the geographical area - and he finally concluded that the Tokugawa regime may
have been an attempt at a universal state that failed22 .
I would like to propose that we abandon such elements as geographical area which are not easy to deal
with and on which it is not easy to attain objectivity.
On the basis of our new criterion, civilizations of western Asia (Arabia, Near East, Byzantine, Orthodox
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Chritian, Islam), which have been hitherto much talked about, are left out, and so too, Mexico and Russia
disappear, and instead of them Japan and probably Tibet become new members.
We know little of Tibetan history because of the insufficiency of materials. After the age of myth that
seems to have lasted 300"",400 years the unification of tribal states by the Lhasa Kingdom took place, which
introduced cultural elements and political systems from China and India at the beginning of the 7th century.
It experienced the decline of royal power in the 9th and 10th centuries, unceasing civil wars from the 11th
to 16th century and at last the establishment of the centralized admistrative power by the 5th Dalai Lama
at the beginning of the 17th century.
This history of Tibet seems to be a synchronous parallel to the process of Japanese history. Japanese
civilization has an abundance of distinctive historical facts and exhibits the four stages of 450 years, 450
years, 450 years and 270 years (interruption by external pressure). Japan with sharp-cut outlines of the
four stages with such proportional distribution of terms may even be called a model defining the pattern of
a big civilization23 .
4
By means of the list of big civilizations made on the basis of the new criterion of the four stages of
400"",500 years each, puzzles arising from several conspicuous phenomena in world history, hitherto the
cause of world-wide disputes, can be solved. The following are my brief comments on these phenomena:
feudalism, absolute power of royalty, capitalism and modernization.
Feudalism.
In order to dissolve the problem of conceptual polysemy offeudalism leading to the difficulty of discussing
it, I have in my work Feudalism - A Comparative Study offered a comparative analysis of the societies so
far treated as feudal. I suggested as my conclusion five factors be regarded as the definition of feudalism.
They are: (1) method of governing a state; (2) dispersion of public powers among provincial lords; (3) a
system of classes and ranks; (4) primitive relation between a lord and his vassals; (5) the grant of estates.
These five factors relate to each other not in a parallel but in a subordinate order; i.e. this is a ranking
order and none of the five factors is to be missing.
i,From this definition, only Europe, Japan, China and Egypt are societies that have experienced pure
feudalism. The Pronoia system of the Byzantine empire, the Iqta and Timar systems of Islam and the
Pomestie system of Russia have hitherto been regarded as feudal, but they are substantially no more than
centralization of the magistrative power, that is, the opposite of feudalism24 .
This survey of feudalism has been done without reference to any civilizational argument. However, quite
unexpectedly, the four purely feudal societies of Europe, Japan, China and Egypt come to cover just the
big civilizations of Type A, so that there seems to be the possibility of interpretation through combining
these two viewpoints: the viewpoint of feudalism and the viewpoint of comparative civilization.
The royal power that gradually strengthened and consolidated itself from the first to the second stage
begins to fall down rapidly in the middle of the second stage, dispersing its real power to provincial nobles,
so that disintegration of the society is brought about. This situation of the society lasts until the end of the
third stage. This is the situation which we have just defined as feudalism.
The civilization expanding its territory in the first stage comes into contact with neighboring races and
realizes itself as a race, until it at last forms a unified state (second stage) covering the full extent of the
race. But in an immature social condition where both traffic and even barter economy do not function, it
is natural that the unified state soon falls into a loose condition and alternates with the regionalism with
tribal antagonism which was the original ground of the society.
Otto Hintze once said feudalism is a means to deal with social difficulties brought about in a certain
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society which under the influence of a foreign imperialism had adopted it for itselp5. However, Hintze's
view leaves unexplained the feudalism of Egypt and China, which had no effects from external imperialism.
I am of the opinion that feudalism is not an effect from outside, but a natural phenomenon woven in the
development of Type A big civilization. Taken as a ph~nomenon based on the law of development of Type
A civilization, the problems of Egypt and China are solved, and other difficulties in the argument of Hintze
also soon ravel out themselves.
General histories of Peru and Tibet often explain political and social conditions or systems of their
mediaeval ages with the term of feudalism26 . This interpretation may be consistent with our interpretation
above.
As for Type B big civilization, we find Max Weber viewing the poleis state of Old Greece as a kind of
feudalism27 . Then it becomes possible to presume that Type B equally experiences and passes through a
feudal situation, if not a full-blown feudalism.
Absolute power of royalty.
The kings succeeding the thrones in both Kingdoms of East and West Franks continued to be the absolute
authority throughout the feudal era, although they possessed indeed less or at most equal real power as the
peerage. The emperor (= Tenno) of Japan was in the same position. He was divested of political power from
the 11th to the 19th century, but he held always the status to grant official ranks and positions including
that of the Supreme Commander (Seii-taishougun).
Historians of traditional thinking represented by HORIGOME Yohzoh derive this phenomenon from
the undeniable traditional authority of royalty coming from the preceding unified state28 , while historians
mainly of Marxian viewpoint including ISHIMODA Tadashi and SERA Terushiroh are the opinion that
rulers of each period reproduced this ancient authority of royalty each time and utilized it to the fullest in
order to get justification of their own governing29 .
This problem has been discussed so far in relation to Western Europe and Japan, but as China is a
similar case, we should take it into account as well. The emperors of the Chou Dynasty (BCll00-BC200),
as is well known, retained their holy authority even in the age of civil wars from the middle of the second
stage (unified state) to the end of the third stage (civil wars) when they had but little real political power.
The throne of the emperors remained thus the pivot of Chinese civilization all the time until the end of the
Chou Dynasty.
Now since these three civilizations belong to Type A, another new interpretation seems to be possible.
As the civilization begins, the world is shifted to a higher dimension than the primitive world. Civilization
is a sort of radiance. The emperor is the source of it and reigns over the world as the king of beings, as
dominus mundi. The world is tinged with gold, so there cannot be any utter disorder, any thoroughly
anarchic condition of the society, however many wars may break out, whatever struggles of classes may
happen. We may take the emperor thus as a higher being than merely a political power, that is to say as
Lord of Civilization who dominates all fields of human activity, namely religion, politics, economy, literature
and art, habits and customs. In such a system it will be quite natural that he still retains his authority
after he has lost political power.
Capitalism.
It is generally assumed that the industrial capitalism has occurred only once throughout world history,
i.e. in Western Europe. But if its final substance lies in merchandise production by means of purchased
labor, we ought to presume the economy of ancient Rome, of the Han Dynasty and of the Tokugawa period
to be the same kind .
There is little room here to enter in the details of this problem, so suffice it to say that those social aspects
similar to the modern age of Western Europe, such as prosperity of big cities, development of commerce
and industry, trade of labor, mass production of merchandise, distribution in a great sphere, absorption of
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land, emergence of the mass of pauperdom and its inflow into cities, are also recognized in each of them. We
know of the dispute over the Greek-Roman capitalism, and there is much controversy on the manufacture
in the Tokugawa period of Japan, too. Scholars including UTSUNOMIYA Kiyoyoshi have indicated the
nature of the industrial capitalism in the economy of the Han Dynasty of China as well3o .
Above all the resemblance between the aspects of the late Tokugawa economy and those of the modern
economy of Western Europe is striking. The dispute on Japanese manufacture which has continued over
the past fifty years relates to Japan in the late Tokugawa period (1800"'1867)31. The assumption is that
the late Tokugawa society had already spontaneously arrived at an early stage of modern (= industrial)
capitalism. Various kinds of manufactures (manual factory industries) can be found in many parts of the
country in the late Tokugawa period: textiles, salt, paper, mining, iron works, brewing and so forth. The
textile manufactures were flanked by wholesale home industries. This was the situation brought about as
the result of gradual development for many centuries, with a similar aspect to that of the 18th century
England which Karl Marx once named 'the manufacturing period properly so called ,32 .
In addition we can also observe the following social phenomena in this period of Japan: development
of roads and sea routs, increase of transportation, development of courier systems, cultivation of merchan-
dise vegetables in suburbs of big cities, mass production of merchandise, formation of the unified market
throughout the country, development of deposit, loan, bill, money order and other banking procedures,
formation of speculative markets and so on.
Japan did ~ot have the Industrial Revolution of its own. It did not create the advanced capitalism after
the Industrial Revolution, either. But when we presume the core of modern (=industrial) capitalism consist
in merchandise production by means of purchased labor, the early stage of modern capitalism and the
advanced capitalism after the Industrial Revolution will come into continuity and Japan of the Tokugawa
period must be taken as having arrived of itself at the stage of modern capitalism.
Since Western Europe, Japan, Greece-Rome and China are all big civilizations, here too,a new interpre-
tation from the viewpoint of comparative civilization becomes possible. I mean namely the industrial
capitalism is the economical system that fundamentally emerges as a natural phenomenon in the fourth
stage of the big civilization and that individual differences may depend on their inclinations.
Modernization.
It excited wonder in the world that Japan whose nation and culture are not European was quick to
make success of modernization in the second half of the 19th century and to rank among world political
and military powers. There is not so far any other example of such a success. Most of people of the world
are still of the opinion that it is due to diligence or skillfulness of the Japanese, solidarity of one race, one
language and one country, pile offortunes, cheap labor, and so on. Max Weber and contemporary American
J apanologists at the very most mention that feudal systems of the preceding Tokugawa period became of
great use for the formation of modern society, so far as bringing up ideas of contract, duty and judicature
are concerned33 .
It will however not suffice, merely to give attention to the preceding period. The problem extends
across the whole range of the history. Histories of Western Europe and of Japan followed parallel lines
and development from the beginning, so that the modern ages of the two came to overlap: this is in my
interpretation the fundamental cause of Japanese modernization and advance in the present period.
In this paper I have presented an outline or a draft of a criterion for judging and clarifying civilizations
objectively. I have also made a rough sketch showing how several conspicuous puzzles of world history can
be solved through the interpretation of history on the basis of this criterion.
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